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Abstract 
We investigate the salary returns to the ability to play football with both feet. The majority of 
footballers are predominantly right footed. Using two data sets, a cross-section of footballers 
in the five main European leagues and a panel of players in the German Bundesliga, we find 
robust evidence of a substantial salary premium for two-footed ability, even after controlling 
for available player performance measures. We assess how this premium varies across the 
salary distribution and by player position. 
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1. Introduction 
 
A number of empirical studies try to explain the observable variation in sports player salaries 
with differences in individual characteristics such as age, experience, number of league and 
international appearances, number of goals scored, and player position, as well as team 
characteristics including sporting and financial performance. They rely on rather “indirect” 
measures of ability and performance that only imperfectly reflect a player’s value to the team.  
In this paper we analyze the impact of two-footedness on earnings among professional 
soccer players. We might expect two-footedness to affect players’ remuneration positively in 
two ways. First, two-footedness may directly affect player performance. Forwards, who are 
paid to score and make goals, may be better able to make space and strike at goal more 
accurately from various angles if they are able to use both feet. Midfielders and defenders 
may be better able to tackle, make passes accurately and fend off the opposition if they are 
adept at moving and intercepting the ball with both feet. In some positions, such as left back 
or right back in defence, being a predominantly one-footed player could be an advantage. But 
in general, being adept with both feet can be seen to be an advantageous skill that might be 
rewarded in the labour market. We seek to explore whether this is indeed the case.  
Second, two-footedness gives the team management the opportunity to use a player in 
various positions on the pitch and this utility may enhance wages over and above 
performance. Thus, two-footedness may be positively correlated with earnings, even after 
accounting for performance, although performance is likely to absorb some part of this 
premium.  
In most labour markets, workers seek to acquire scarce skills which can enhance their 
earnings power but is two-footedness an innate ability or is it a skill that can be acquired by 
training and learning? There is clearly a fixed component to two-footedness, as a natural 
physical attribute, but it can be learned to some degree. Learning two-footedness can occur, 
for example, post-injury if a player is constrained in using his previously strong foot. It is also 
taught in some countries and it is possible that there is player learning. In an article in the 
English football magazine When Saturday Comes, entitled ‘One foot wonders’, English 
Premier League coaches and youth academy directors were interviewed on this question. 
These interviews revealed that coaches in English football tended to accept one-footedness as 
a given attribute. However, some coaches pointed out that training methods used in England 
tended not to emphasise work done to improve performance with a player’s weaker foot, 
noting that coaches in Brazil, Holland and Africa tended to be more inclined to address and 
rectify poor performance, especially in terms of passing and shooting, with a player’s weaker 
foot. These observations by coaches suggest that two-footedness is mainly but not wholly an 
innate ability and is something that can be developed, to some extent, by training. 
It appears that this is beginning to change. A soccer school was set up in the UK in 
2004 claiming to be “the first and original soccer school that concentrates solely on 
improving the other foot” (http://www.theotherfootsoccerschool.com/about.htm) 1. 
Nevertheless, this training of two-footedness is something that can only be properly 
developed at an early age in the formative years of a player’s career and is difficult to instill 
in the established professional players that comprise our samples. Furthermore, a recent study 
of amateur and professional players found a “surprising absence of plasticity in foot use, 
given the importance of learning, experience and culture in models of handedness and 
                                                     
1 Those who set up the school cite the inspiration of Tom Finney, a famous English forward in the 1950s, who 
played in all the forward positions for England having taught himself two-footedness 
(http://www.theotherfootsoccerschool.com/may08_article.pdf). 
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footedness” (Carey et al., 2009).2 Hence, we can treat footedness as a pre-determined 
specialist ability that is capable of generating a return to salary. 
We analyse two data sets in order to determine the extent of any salary premium for a 
player’s ability to use two feet in professional soccer. In our first data set, which is a large 
cross-section covering players from the top five European leagues, having controlled for 
demographics, player position, and national league it appears that two-footed players enjoy a 
pay premium of around 14 to 15% over right-footed players. Left-footed players also receive 
a pay premium in most of our estimates using this European cross-section, though it is 
considerably smaller than the premium for two-footedness in most model specifications.  
Our second data set is panel data for players appearing in the German Bundesliga. We 
then create a panel from the careers of players in the 2005/06 Bundesliga cohort going back 
to 2002/03. We confirm a sizeable salary premium for two-footed players in these data, 
although there appears to be no premium for left-footed players relative to right-footed 
players. 
 
 
2. Literature Review 
 
Several empirical studies examine the remuneration of players in European soccer. These 
include Lehmann and Weigand (1999), Lehmann (2000), Huebl and Swieter (2002), Lucifora 
and Simmons (2003), Lehmann and Schulze (2008), Garcia-del-Barrio and Pujol (2007), 
Frick (2006; 2007) and Frick and Deutscher (2009). The model structure of these studies is 
quite similar. In standard Mincer-style, player salaries are influenced by age, (career) games 
played, (career) goals scored, international caps, player position, assists and tackles, 
“superstar status”, and contract duration. While age and experience have a positive, yet 
decreasing effect, the influence of contract duration is strictly linear. Midfielders and 
forwards earn a premium relative to defenders. Higher productivity also has a positive and 
linear influence on wages.  
Significant impacts of experience, performance and peer reputation on salary can also 
be found in studies of North American sports, see Hamilton (1997) on basketball, Kahn 
(1993) for baseball, Berri and Simmons (2009) and Simmons and Berri (2009) on American 
football and Idson and Kahane (2000) for hockey.  
These papers show that the salaries of professional sports players are influenced 
systematically by factors such as age, experience and performance in very similar ways to 
those found in other occupations. Where sports teams differ is in the distribution of salaries 
which is even more highly skewed than in standard occupations. Also sports teams apply 
more stringent selection procedures into occupations. For example, poor performance by a 
player results in being dropped from the team squad and very quickly being discarded; there 
are high levels of mobility within the industry (between teams) and into and out of the 
industry, with shorter careers than in most occupations. The large skewness of the salary 
distribution and high degree of player mobility appear to apply to all team sports, including 
North American major leagues as well as European soccer. 
Some literature exists relating physical attributes such as height to earnings and also 
relating subjective attributes such as beauty to salary. Of particular relevance to our study is 
the literature on handedness and earnings. According to Denny and O’Sullivan (2007), left-
handed men earn about 5% more than right-handed men while left-handed women earn 4% 
less than right-handed women. Ruebeck, Harrington and Moffitt (2007) find that highly 
educated left-handed men earn significantly more than highly educated right-handed men. 
                                                     
2 http://www.cortexjournal.net/article/S0010-9452(08)00258-X/abstract 
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This effect is most pronounced among those receiving lower than average earnings for the 
highly educated group. 
How, then, does footedness affect salary in soccer? We suggest three possible channels. 
 
Direct effect on performance 
Because two-footed players can play the ball with either foot, they may score more goals if, 
for example, defenders find it harder to read their movements. This allows two-footed players 
to throw defenders off balance, thus creating space for scoring opportunities. In midfield, 
two-footed players may have a better range of passes and are more likely to complete a pass 
however they receive the ball. Coaches recognize this and give two-footed players more 
appearances than one-footed players. Defenders may also find two-footedness advantageous. 
For instance, they may be able to clear the ball away from goal more effectively than single-
footed players whichever way the ball comes to them, and they may be able to get a tackle in 
on a striker whichever direction the striker takes. 
 
Positional utility 
Since two-footed players are similarly skilled with either foot this means they can fill more 
positions on the team than one-footed players, i.e. a two-footed midfield player can play left, 
centre or right midfield whereas a right-footed midfield player could only fill centre or right 
midfield and may perform poorly in left midfield, although there are occasions where coaches 
will play a right-footed player on the left wing, with instructions to cut inside and shoot. 
 
Correlation of footedness with other attributes 
Denny and O’Sullivan (2007) suggest that there may be a correlation between left 
handedness and IQ, so left handed people may be cleverer than otherwise similar right 
handed people. Analogously, if being two-footed is correlated with IQ two-footed players 
may be better able to read the game and anticipate situations. Their physical dexterity may be 
associated with greater mental dexterity. For instance two-footed players may have more time 
to think instinctively or set up attacks from midfield partly because they have more space and 
time to do so due to being able to control a pass or ricochet more quickly and accurately than 
a one-footed player can. Extending this point, and drawing on Denny and O’Sullivan (2007), 
if physical dexterity with feet is correlated with mental intelligence, two-footed players may 
have better bargaining skills in salary negotiations. 
 
 
3. Hypotheses and Data 
 
We test three hypotheses suggested by the above discussion. First, we test the proposition that 
there is a salary premium for two-footedness. Second, we hypothesize that much of this 
premium is accounted for by performance but some remains even after controlling for 
performance. Third we test the proposition that the salary premium for two-footedness is 
greater for forwards and midfielders than for defenders but the forwards’ premium will fall 
more markedly once performance is accounted for. This is because the positional utility 
argument is stronger for midfielders. 
Finally we consider whether the premium for two-footedness varies over the salary 
distribution. 
We use two data sets to explore these hypotheses. 
 
 
 
4 
 
Data Set 1 (www.transfermarkt.de) 
Our first data set is a large cross section with information on 3,127 players who at the 
beginning of the 2005/06 season were under contract by one of the first division teams in 
either England, France, Germany, Italy, or Spain (source: www.transfermarkt.de). Our 
analyses exclude the 339 goalkeepers, 297 players with missing information on preferred foot 
and 68 players with missing information on salary, age or height. This gives 2,264 
observations with complete information on all relevant variables. Goalkeepers are excluded 
as footedness is not especially relevant for their performance and hence their salary. 
A descriptive analysis of these data reveals that the majority of the players are right-
footed (60%); 22% are left-footed players and only 18% of the players in the five leagues are 
equally strong with both feet. The classification of players is undertaken by external experts 
who assess players based on observation of matches. 
 
Data Set 2 Bundesliga panel 
Our second data set has player salary recorded over several seasons by Kicker magazine. 
Here, we take the assessment of footedness from the first data set, isolating those players 
appearing in the German Bundesliga. We then create a panel from the careers of players in 
the 2005/06 Bundesliga cohort. This comprises 1,314 player-season observations over 
2002/03 to 2006/07. These data comprise players active in 2005/06 whose footedness can be 
identified from the presence of the same players in the European cross-section data set. 
Hence, this panel is constructed from a particular cohort of players in the Bundesliga. 
Both www.transfermarkt.de  and Kicker offer market valuations of players assessed at 
the beginning of a season as a proxy for undisclosed salary, which remains private and 
confidential in Europe. We can be confident of the reliability of these proxies for several 
reasons. First, the correlation between salary figures produced from each source is high, at 
0.75 (Torgler et al., 2006). Second, the Kicker source has assessed player valuations by a 
stable team of experts who have established consistent practice over a long period. Third, the 
team of experts at Kicker magazine have accessed a sub-sample of actual salaries from the 
Bundesliga and found a high correlation of 0.80 between these actual salaries and Kicker 
market valuations (Torgler and Schmidt, 2007; Frick, 2006). Fourth, both 
www.transfermarkt.de and Kicker have excellent coverage of players, ranging from high- and 
low-profile players and including every team in the five major European leagues (England, 
France, Germany, Italy and Spain) in the former and Germany in the latter. 
We interpret the players’ market values as published by Kicker as particularly reliable. 
Aggregating the individual market values across teams and dividing these by a constant 
factor of 1.5 results in the aggregated wage bill of each team in the Bundesliga as published 
in the annual reports of the German Football Association over the period 1996-2007.  
Tables 1 and 2 show that two-footed players and left-footed players are minorities in 
both the European cross section and the Bundesliga panel. The Bundesliga appears to have a 
higher proportion of two-footed midfield players than other leagues and this helps generate 
the greater share of two-footed players overall in Germany.  
Salaries are typically lower in Germany compared to other leagues, notably England 
and Spain (Frick, 2007). In the cross-section, two-footed players are older, on average, and 
score more goals per game. Greater scoring power by two-footed players might simply be a 
reflection of forwards being disproportionately two-footed relative to players as a whole and 
Table 1 offers some suggestion that this might be the case for the European cross-section. 
Similarly, in the Bundesliga panel, two-footed players also score more goals per game. But, 
in contrast to the European cross-section, Table 2 above shows that forwards in the 
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Bundesliga are not disproportionately more likely to be two-footed than players as a whole in 
that league.3   
Table 3 indicates that there is a large raw salary premium for two-footedness over being 
right-footed or left-footed. It is apparent in both data sets. 
 
 
4. Estimation 
 
Our most general model is: 
 
ln(Salary) = α0 + α1 Age + α2 Age2 + α3 Height + α4 Height2 + α5 Left foot + α6 Two foot + α7 
Midfield + α8 Forward + α9 League Dummies (or Club Dummies) + α10Attendance + 
α11International Status + α12Nationality + α13 Performance +  ε 
 
where, for the European cross-section, ln(Salary) is the log of annual salary (in €); age is 
player age in years plus its squared term; height is player height in centimetres plus its 
squared term; left foot and two foot are dummy variables where the reference category is 
right-footed; midfield and forward are dummies for players’ positions, with defender as the 
reference category; there are five league dummies for England (the Premier League), France 
(Ligue 1), Germany (Bundesliga) and Italy (Serie A), with Spain (Primera Liga) as the 
reference category. Attendance is a vector of interaction terms between league dummies and 
average club home attendance from the previous season: these capture varying club market 
size effects on player salary across teams and leagues. International status is a vector of 
dummies (Eng04, Fr04 etc.) for current internationals defined according to whether the player 
appeared in the national team in any international fixture in 2004/05.4 Nationality is a vector 
of nationality terms showing country of birth, as defined in www.11v11.co.uk. These are 
grouped as: England, France, Germany, Italy, Western Europe, Eastern Europe, North 
America, Africa and Asia with Spain as omitted category. Performance is a vector of player 
performance variables that includes numbers of starting appearances by players in 2003/04 
and 2004/05 (App03 and App04 respectively);  number of substitute appearances (Sub03 for 
appearances in 03/04 and Sub04 for 04/05); goals per game (including substitute 
appearances) in 2003/04 (Goal03pg) and 2004/05 (Goal04pg); a dummy for appearances in a 
Champions’ League match in given season (Champion03, Champion04) and a dummy for 
appearances in a UEFA Cup match in given season (Uefa03, Uefa04). 
The salary model for the Bundesliga is similar except that height is absent from the 
data; club attendance is denoted by log attendance; international dummies are only available 
for South America (intsam), Western Europe (intwest) which now includes  those countries 
defined for the European cross-section plus England, France, Germany and Italy, Eastern 
Europe (inteast) and Germany (intger). Nationality dummies are recorded as Eastern 
European, Western European, Africa, Asia, South America and North America with 
Germany as omitted category. These nationality groupings are constructed to be consistent 
with codings for international status. In the performance measures, appearances refer to 
games appeared in previous season and comprises starts plus substitute appearances. 
Similarly, Champions League, UEFA cup and goals per game are each defined as records 
from the previous season. Season dummies are included in estimates using the Bundesliga 
                                                     
3 Probits for the correlates of two-footedness are available from the authors on request. 
4 WEUR is a set of European countries not otherwise identified e.g Holland, Portugal; EEUR refers to eastern 
European countries e.g. Russia, Ukraine, SAM refers to Central and South American countries, NAM refers to 
North American countries, AFRICA to all African countries, ASIA to Middle East, Australia, New Zealand and 
Asia. 
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panel. Since our focus is on effects of foot attributes we do not include player fixed effects 
but do include club fixed effects in our most general model.  
Finally, the Bundesliga data contain an additional performance measure, subjective 
ratings of performance from Kicker magazine. A growing literature uses expert evaluations as 
useful product information that contains intangible and uncertain quality signals. For 
example, Elliott and Simmons (2008) show how review scores of film critics are correlated 
positively with UK film revenues. The use of match evaluations from Kicker improves our 
ability to test the sensitivity of the two-footed premium to fine controls for player 
performance (for an application to German football, see Franck and Nüesch, 2008). In 
Germany, a team of sports experts produces evaluations of player performances using 
discrete grades from 1.0 (excellent) to 6.0 (very bad). We take the seasonal average scores for 
each player, who must play at least 30 minutes in a given match, and deduct this score from 7 
to aid interpretation. We observe that defenders gain higher scores on average than forwards 
and to correct for any positional bias in ratings we divide each player’s score by the 
positional average for each season. 
Throughout we estimate OLS models for the whole sample and, in order to test the 
effects of two-footedness by player position, on split samples for defenders, midfielders and 
attackers.  
Several studies of salary in professional team sports use quantile regression estimation 
since log salary measures tend to have even greater kurtosis values than standard occupations 
(Hamilton, 1997; Reilly and Witt, 2007; Berri and Simmons, 2009; Simmons and Berri, 
2009; Vincent and Eastman, 2009). Of course, ordinary least squares is the best linear 
unbiased estimator provided that the error distribution is homoscedastic. Moreover, ordinary 
least squares parameters tend to a normal distribution around true values even if the 
individual residuals are not normally distributed. The particular advantage of quantile 
regression is that it facilitates examination of salary returns to characteristics at different 
points in the salary distribution (Koenker, 2005; Vincent and Eastman, 2009). Ordinary least 
squares constrains marginal effects of covariates to be the same at the mean and elsewhere. 
But in salary models, and more so in sports than in standard labour markets, the average 
salary is greater than the median due to excess kurtosis of the distribution. Marginal effects at 
the median are not necessarily the same as at the mean or anywhere else in the distribution. 
The presence of player outliers, superstars in European football, may well cause marginal 
effects of covariates, such as two-footedness, to differ through the distribution. However, we 
have no prior on the pattern of this variation. It does appear, though, from evidence on North 
American sports, that marginal effects of covariates on player salaries do differ in magnitude, 
sometimes substantially, over the salary distribution (Berri and Simmons, 2009; Simmons 
and Berri, 2009; Vincent and Eastman, 2009). 
Presence of non-normality in the dependent variable is indicated by a large kurtosis 
value and in our case the D’Agostino (1990) test is performed by the sktest command in Stata 
10.1. We can investigate the impacts of footedness at any quantile of the salary distribution, 
not just the conditional mean. Moreover, the quantile regression approach is semi-parametric 
in that it avoids assumptions about the parametric distribution of the regression error term, an 
especially suitable feature where the data are heteroskedastic as in our case. To ensure 
robustness of standard errors, we bootstrap with 200 replications.  
 
 
5. Results 
 
We build up our salary models beginning with a naïve specification containing just left foot 
and two-footed. We then proceed to add in sequence groups of variables to represent physical 
7 
 
and demographic characteristics (age, height and nationality), job characteristics (position 
dummies), ability to pay (league dummies and club attendances) and performance covariates 
(appearances, goals, European games, international status). The final, most general 
specification adds in club dummies for club-level unobserved fixed effects. This leads to 
some of the club characteristics in previous specifications dropping out. The results of this 
exercise for the European cross-section are shown in Table 4. All estimates are carried out 
with the 2,264 observations appropriate to the most general specification. Reported t-statistics 
shown in parentheses are computed with robust standard errors. 
As Table 4 shows, each insertion of another group of variables adds explanatory power. 
Throughout, we derive percentage impacts of changes in dummy variable from coefficients 
as exp(β) – 1, where β is an estimated coefficient (Halvorsen and Palmquist, 1980). On this 
basis the salary premium for being a two-footed player relative to being right-footed begins at 
82.2% and is still high at 51.3% with the addition of demographic, job and ability-to-pay 
variables. The two-footed premium falls dramatically with the introduction of performance 
controls to 16.4%. It falls further to 15.4% with the addition of club fixed effects. There is a 
raw premium of 14.8% for left-footedness relative to being right-footed. Unlike the two-
footed premium it moves up and down with the addition of controls. The premium for left-
footedness is significant in the final general specification with club fixed effects and at 14.0% 
it is almost as high as the two-footed premium. The left-footed premium is statistically 
significantly lower than the two-footed premium in all specifications until the introduction of 
performance controls, when the two-footed premium and left-footed premium are not 
statistically significantly different from one another. One reason why the premium for two-
footedness declines faster than the premium for left-footedness is that the left-footedness 
premium may be driven primarily by its utility value to team managers, rather than through 
performance, whereas the two-footed premium is a combination of the two.  
Table 5 presents the coefficients for the control variables in the club fixed effects model 
presented in the last row of Table 4. The signs and significance of the control variables in the 
OLS estimates are much as to be expected with magnitudes that appear plausible. Salary is 
maximized at an age level of 26, which is slightly below estimates of 27 or 28 reported 
elsewhere in salary studies of European football (Lucifora and Simmons, 2003; Frick, 2007). 
Height is not significant, which is not surprising as the variation in this variable is rather 
small. Forwards gain a salary premium over midfielders who in turn gain a premium over 
equivalent defenders, a ranking noted by Frick (2007). An extra appearance last season 
delivers a greater increment to salary than an extra appearance in the season prior to that, 
suggesting that the impact of appearances on salary declines as time recedes. Also plausible 
is the result that an extra substitute appearance has a lower impact on salary than an extra 
starting appearance. Goals per game in the last season have a positive effect on salary giving 
an extra boost to forwards’ pay over and above their positional premium. Appearing in a 
Champions’ League game in the previous season generates a salary increase which is greater 
than a Champions’ League appearance in the season before that. UEFA Cup appearances also 
deliver salary increments, but to a lesser extent than Champions’ League appearances. Again, 
this is a plausible reflection of the greater prestige and status afforded to the Champions’ 
League as opposed to the UEFA Cup. 
Not reported in Table 5 are estimates of club attendance, nationality and international 
status coefficients. Among the attendance effects, which we take as a proxy for market size or 
ability to pay, the largest marginal effect, of 0.018, is to be found in Spain (which also has the 
greatest variation in attendance), followed by Italy (0.013) and England (0.011). Club 
attendance had no significant impact on salary in France or Germany.  
Nationality and international status effects deliver some interesting results in the OLS 
estimates. Other things equal, England non-internationals receive a 68.9% penalty relative to 
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similar Spanish non-internationals but England internationals manage to more than offset this 
with a large 204% premium. Similarly, relative to Spanish non-internationals, German non-
internationals also receive a salary penalty of 48.7% that is outweighed for German 
internationals by a 98.6% salary premium. Italian and French internationals each receive 
salary premia of more than 60% with no salary penalty for compatriate non-internationals. 
Western European and South American players receive salary premia relative to Spanish non-
internationals, of 31.9% and 49.8% respectively. Overall, the performance of our control 
variables appears credible and also conforms to results from earlier studies.5 
The estimated footedness premia are identical across the five European leagues (the 
respective interaction terms – not reported here – are statistically insignificant). We interpret 
this as evidence that due to the liberalization of the national player markets induced by the 
Bosman-ruling in late 1995 we can now think in terms of a European salary model for 
players. 
The Huber robust regression results in Table 5 show similar impacts of footedness on 
earnings as OLS. The only main differences concern lack of significance of some of the 
season 03/04 performance variables, such as goals per game, Champions League and UEFA 
cup appearances. The lack of significance of these variables from two seasons back simply 
reinforces the importance of performance earned in the recent past for current salary. Player 
contracts are of a rolling variety with periodic renegotiations sometimes long before an 
existing contract is due to expire. Such renegotiations are more likely to occur, with 
consequent higher salary, when players have shown enhanced performance, if only to retain 
the player in face of competing offers from rival clubs.  
In our cross-section, the p-value for the test statistic of the null hypothesis that kurtosis 
does not depart from the value associated with a normal distribution is 0.012 and hence our 
log salary data depart from normality, a result that is similar to those found in some studies of 
North American sports (e.g. Berri and Simmons, 2009 on NFL). We therefore report quantile 
regression estimates in Table 6. Along with Frick and Deutscher (2009), our study is one of 
just two to utilize quantile regression to estimate a salary model in European team sports.  
The estimates did not converge with club fixed effects so we simply retain league 
dummies: our model specification is thus as per the specification used for the penultimate 
model reported in Table 4. In the median quantile regression estimates, the control variables 
have coefficients and significance much in line with OLS.6 
The impacts of footedness on salary are found to vary somewhat over the distribution. 
We find a significant premium for two-footedness at 5% or better at 0.1, 0.75 and 0.9 
quantiles, with the largest premia found at the top and bottom of the salary distribution. A 
significant premium for left-footedness is found at 0.1 and 0.5 quantiles. At the median an F-
test for coefficient equality (lincom in Stata) shows that the hypothesis of equality of returns 
from two-footedness and left-footedness cannot be rejected at 1% level. Hence, at the 
median, there is no salary advantage to being two-footed over being left-footed. This can be 
interpreted to mean that both attributes are indicators of scarce ability, recalling that the large 
majority of players is predominantly right-footed. But at higher quantiles, 0.75 and 0.9, we 
find that the left-footed premium is not significantly different from zero whereas the two-
footed premium is significant, with large magnitudes of 20 to 22 percent. We note that 
Germany has higher proportions of both two-footed and left-footed player compared to other 
leagues (compare Tables 1 and 2). The short supply of left-footed and two-footed players 
                                                     
5 Interactions between nationality and two-footedness were not jointly significant. 
6 The only substantial differences concern the nationality and international dummies. We find that the only 
nationality dummy to be significant at the median quantile is South America with a positive premium. 
International players from England, Italy, Germany, Spain and France all receive, in descending order of 
magnitude, substantial salary premia relative to Spanish non-internationals.  
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apparent in most European leagues is not present in Germany. The prevalence of left-footed 
players in the Bundesliga means that the opportunity for players to extract a salary premium 
for this attribute is absent. 
Frick (2007) shows that, in the Bundesliga at least, there is a stable ranking of salary by 
position with forwards earning more than midfielders, on average, who then earn more than 
defenders. This prompts us to ask how the premium for foot dexterity varies by position. 
Table 7 shows the premia for two-footed and left-foot characteristics in our European cross-
section, by position. We present two models for each player position: the first conditions on 
demographics and ability to pay, as per Table 4 row 4, whereas the second model also 
conditions on player performance, as per Table 4 row 5. Without controls for performance, 
the results indicate a significant salary premium for two-footedness for defenders, midfielders 
and forwards, with midfielders having the largest premium and defenders the smallest. There 
is no evidence of a significant premium for left-footedness. When controls for performance 
are added the two-footed premium falls substantially and only remains statistically significant 
in the case of midfielders. Conditioning on performance also results in a significant salary 
premium for left-footed midfielders relative to right-footed midfielders, although the 
premium is not as large as the two-footed premium. These findings are consistent with the 
conjecture that two-footedness is of greater use as an attribute for midfielders who require a 
wider range of skills such as controlling the ball, turning away from opponents while 
retaining possession, moving into different positions to receive the ball, passing the ball and 
shooting. It might be argued that forwards must also have the most of the aforementioned 
skills but our results tend to suggest that the salaries of forwards are determined more by 
what they achieve, essentially goals scored, than their footedness attributes. 
Hence, our additional estimations show first, that a two-footedness premium is more 
evident and larger at the top and bottom of the salary distribution and second, that it is 
concentrated on midfield positions where two-footedness could be a strong factor affecting 
unobserved player performance.  
 
Bundesliga panel 
To establish whether we can generalize from our findings to other data sources we turn to the 
Bundesliga panel, as a means of external validation. This has a smaller number of players 
identified by footedness measures taken from the European cross-section with these players 
tracked through their careers. 
Table 8 presents models that are similar to those for the European cross-section 
presented in Table 4. As with the European cross-section we see that adding groups of 
variables leads to consecutive reductions in two-footed premium, so that in the most general 
specification there is a premium of 13%, significant at the 1% level. This club fixed effects 
model is estimated on a sub-sample with positive appearances only. If we focus on the full 
sample models in rows 4 and 5, these show us how the two-footed premium responds to 
performance controls. The two-footed premium is 20% controlling for demographics, 
position and ability to pay, but falls to 8.1% when performance controls are added and is not 
statistically significant. One key difference between the two samples is that the left-footed 
premium is statistically insignificant in all specifications using the Bundesliga panel.  
The OLS estimates are put into some doubt as, in the case of the Bundesliga panel, the 
p-value for the D’Agostino test on log salary is 0.022, showing a statistically significant 
departure from normality of the dependent variable. This suggests the need to use quantile 
regression and estimates, again with bootstrapped standard errors, are shown in Table 9. We 
find that the salary premium in the Bundesliga for two-footedness is significant at 10 per cent 
or better across all quantiles except 0.1, where it is statistically non-significant. At the median 
the premium for two-footedness is estimated at 13.7%, which turns out to be the same as for 
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the median in the European cross-section, though the former is estimated with greater 
precision. Thus, the quantile regression results from the Bundesliga panel corroborate those 
from the European cross-section.7 
We test the sensitivity of the Bundesliga results to the addition of the Kicker subjective 
performance rating, incorporating variables for the individual’s score relative to the average 
for the position he plays in (forward, midfield or defence). These scores are not available for 
all players, so the sample size for estimation falls to 1,156. Although these three variables are 
themselves strongly positive and statistically significant, they have only a marginal effect on 
the size of the two-footed premium. For instance, the premium of 8.3% estimated for two-
footedness in the penultimate model in Table 9 becomes 7.1% (significant at a 9% confidence 
interval). Quantile regression estimates indicate that the two-footed premium is confined to 
those in the top quartile of the salary distribution once the performance ratings are added to 
the performance controls.  
Given our evidence that two-footed players in the Bundesliga appear to earn a 
statistically significant salary premium, much of which is related to player performance, it is 
natural to ask whether variations in team members through footedness can affect team 
performance. Are there opportunities for teams to exploit labour market inefficiencies by 
raising the share of two-footed players in a team? To answer this question, we constructed a 
team-level data set from the Bundesliga panel with team payroll and team points over the 
period 2003/04 to 2006/07. This restriction reduces the number of teams qualifying for our 
sample from 72 to 57. We also obtained the share of total appearances accounted for by two-
footed players for teams which had sufficient coverage of players, taken to be a minimum of 
10. Following Simmons and Forrest (2004), we then performed an OLS regression of points 
on relative average payroll, scaled by average for a given season, and its square. If we add the 
relative share of appearances by two-footed players to this regression and find it significant 
then this is evidence that two-footed players are underpaid in the Bundesliga player market.8 
If Bundesliga players are paid a competitive salary, appropriate to their position, experience 
and performance then the coefficient on two-footed appearance share should be insignificant. 
The results of a pooled OLS regression, with t-statistics in parentheses, are shown below9: 
 
Points = 35.85Relative average payroll – 6.31Relative average payroll2 + 2.31Two-footed 
     (4.83)                                            (3.11)                                          (0.31) 
 appearance share 
n = 57, R2 = 0.55 
 
 A similar model was constructed for the European cross-section, with 98 teams 
covering the five major leagues. The results are: 
 
Points = 25.96Relative average payroll – 3.14Relative average payroll2 + 9.13Two-footed 
     (5.67)                                            (3.11)                                          (0.91) 
appearance share 
n = 98, R2 = 0.67 
                                                     
7 One key difference in impacts of control variables between Bundesliga panel and European cross-section is the 
absence of salary premia for midfield and forward players. Although log salary deviates significantly from 
normality in the Bundesliga, we note that nevertheless the player salary distribution is more compressed in 
Germany relative to other countries. This relative compression may explain the lack of premia for particular 
positions. 
8 Frick and Simmons (2008) found evidence that head coaches were underpaid in the Bundesliga but also argued 
that over- or under-payment of players would be less likely. 
9Inclusion of a variable denoting the appearance share of left-footed players delivered insignificant coefficients 
in each data set. 
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These results confirm the finding of efficient pricing of two-footedness across 
European leagues. From both data sets, it is indeed the case that the two-footed appearance 
variable has an insignificant coefficient, and in the dimension of footedness at least, 
opportunities to increase performance by raising the appearance share of two-footed players 
appear to be absent. This is not surprising given the increased degree of player mobility 
across football leagues that was made possible by the Bosman ruling of 1995 (see Frick, 2009 
for an analysis of the impact of the Bosman ruling on player mobility). One interpretation of 
our result is that players appropriate the rents from their scarce footedness skill. However, 
player bargaining power is such that they are able to move between clubs even if there is a 
points premium attached to a team that raises its share of two-footed players. 
 
 
6. Summary and Implications 
 
We have presented substantial evidence in favour of a premium for two-footedness, over and 
above controls for demographics, player position in team, club ability to pay and player 
performance. Our OLS results from both data sets show a robust premium for two-
footedness, albeit one that declines when performance variables are added. Even with 
performance variables included, the two-footedness premium is substantial, at 15.4% in the 
European cross-section and 13.2% in the Bundesliga panel.  
The premia for two-footedness and left-footedness, relative to the most common case of 
right-footedness, are found to vary across the salary distribution in the European cross-
section, being higher at the top and bottom of the salary distribution compared to the median. 
In contrast, this premium is quite flat across the salary distribution in Bundesliga panel and is 
absent for left-footedness. Controlling for performance in the European cross-section the 
premia for two-footedness is only significant for midfield players, a finding that is consistent 
with the proposition that two-footedness is particularly valuable for utility players. 
 Finally, although we find evidence of salary premia for two-footed players in 
both our data sets, we do not find that utilising more two-footed players adds significantly to 
team performance. Hence, the observed salary premia do not carry over to mis-pricing of 
players in the market for footballers in Europe.  
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Table 1: Distribution of Left- and Right-Footed Players in European Cross Section 
 
Preferred 
Foot 
Defender Midfielder Forward All Players 
Right 61.5 56.6 62.6 59.7 
Left 29.9 22.1 11.4 22.4 
Left/Right 8.6 21.3 26.0 17.9 
   
Total 795 935 534 2,264 
 
 
Table 2: Distribution of Left- and Right-Footed Players in Bundesliga Panel 
 
Preferred 
Foot 
Defender Midfielder Forward All Players 
Right 55.3 49.5 51.3 51.3 
Left 33.5 19.2 23.8 23.8 
Left/Right 11.2 31.3 24.9 24.9 
   
Total 161 198 107 466 
 
 
Table 3: Descriptive statistics for log salary: Mean (standard deviation) 
 
Category European cross-section Bundesliga panel 
Two-footed 14.64 (1.54) 14.23 (1.03) 
Left-footed 14.18 (1.30) 14.06 (0.90) 
Right-footed 14.04 (1.33) 14.01 (0.91) 
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Table 4: Footedness effects for alternative model specifications with European cross-
section 
 
Specification Two foot Left foot R2 
Naïve 0.600 (7.09) 0.138 (2.03) 0.026 
+ Demographics 0.562 (7.73) 0.081 (1.34) 0.265 
+ Job 0.515 (7.06) 0.121 (2.00) 0.274 
+ Ability to pay 0.414 (6.22) 0.098 (1.74) 0.380 
+ Performance 0.155 (2.82) 0.110 (2.28) 0.576 
Club fixed effects 0.143 (2.56) 0.131 (2.67) 0.605 
Note: Control variables are as follows. Demographics: age, age squared, full set of nationality 
dummies. Job: midfield, forward. Ability to pay: attendance variables by country. 
Performance: appearances, substitute appearances, goals per game, Champions’ League 
appearance dummies, international status dummies. Reference categories are defender, 
Spanish league, Spanish nationality and Spanish international. 
 
 
Table 5: OLS and Robust Regression Results for European Cross-Section 
  
Variable OLS Robust regression 
Two foot 0.143 (2.56)*** 0.138 (2.52)** 
Left foot 0.131 (2.67)*** 0.120 (2.50)** 
Age 0.836 (14.44)*** 0.857 (16.64)*** 
Age2 -0.016 (14.82)*** -0.016 (16.60)*** 
Height -18.73 (1.13) -18.85 (1.29) 
Height2 5.40 (1.19) 5.453 (1.36) 
Midfield 0.159 (3.20)*** 0.165 (3.41)*** 
Forward 0.265 (3.71)*** 0.272 (4.28)*** 
App03 0.010 (4.44)*** 0.010 (3.57)*** 
App04 0.029 (11.14)*** 0.028 (9.43)*** 
Sub03 0.000 (0.08) -0.002 (0.66) 
Sub04 0.017 (2.87)*** 0.014 (2.08)** 
Goal03pg 0.119 (0.54) 0.071 (0.28) 
Goal04pg 1.258 (5.37)*** 1.249 (4.76)*** 
Champion03 0.180 (2.79)*** 0.145 (1.73)* 
Champion04 0.356 (4.66)*** 0.337 (3.76)*** 
UEFA03 0.118 (2.11)** 0.114 (1.58) 
UEFA04 0.223 (2.59)*** 0.263 (2.73)*** 
 Also includes club 
attendance, nationality 
dummies, international 
status dummies and club 
fixed effects 
Also includes club 
attendance, nationality 
dummies, international 
status dummies and club 
dummies 
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Table 6: Quantile regression results for European cross-section 
 
Quantile 0.1 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.9 
Two foot 0.229 
(2.55)** 
0.102 
(1.37) 
0.128 
(1.75)* 
0.182 
(2.42)** 
0.202 
(2.82)*** 
Left foot 0.154 
(2.08)** 
0.096 
(1.38) 
0.148 
(2.77)*** 
0.045 
(0.81) 
0.011 
(0.16) 
Age 1.059 
(9.66)*** 
0.985 
(11.28)*** 
0.794 
(10.25)*** 
0.643 
(10.25)*** 
0.534 
(6.87)*** 
Age2 -0.020 
(9.52)*** 
-0.018 
(11.42)*** 
-0.015 
(10.79)*** 
-0.012 
(10.84)*** 
-0.011 
(7.41)*** 
Height -7.807 
(0.39) 
14.97 
(1.48) 
-10.75 
(0.46) 
-60.21 
(3.21)*** 
-42.31 
(2.37)** 
Height2 2.415 
(0.44) 
-1.907 
(0.57) 
3.198 
(0.50) 
16.86 
(3.25)*** 
11.96 
(2.41)** 
Midfield 0.200 
(2.31)** 
0.144 
(2.02)** 
0.152 
(2.54)** 
0.153 
(2.38)** 
0.180 
(2.70)*** 
Forward 0.180 
(1.56) 
0.211 
(2.14)** 
0.201 
(2.33)** 
0.157 
(1.77)* 
0.227 
(2.32)** 
App03 0.015 
(3.87)*** 
0.012 
(3.69)*** 
0.011 
(4.43)*** 
0.011 
(4.81)*** 
0.004 
(1.23) 
App04 0.034 
(6.76)*** 
0.026 
(6.56)*** 
0.027 
(8.89)*** 
0.024 
(7.55)*** 
0.021 
(4.98)*** 
Sub03 0.004 
(0.53) 
-0.006 
(0.86) 
-0.005 
(0.70) 
-0.009 
(1.16) 
-0.006 
(0.69) 
Sub04 0.029 
(2.64)*** 
0.020 
(2.35)** 
0.021 
(2.89)*** 
0.009 
(1.19) 
-0.007 
(0.71) 
Goal03pg 0.065  
(0.19) 
0.170 
(0.54) 
0.080 
(0.37) 
0.044 
(0.17) 
0.179 
(0.49) 
Goal04pg 1.639 
(4.22)*** 
1.544 
(5.01)*** 
1.522 
(6.46)*** 
1.275 
(4.19)*** 
1.330 
(3.55)*** 
Champion03 0.357 
(3.09)*** 
0.352 
(4.79)*** 
0.274 
(3.81)*** 
 
0.264 
(3.20)*** 
0.201 
(2.03)** 
Champion04 0.413 
(4.11)*** 
0.442 
(5.02)*** 
0.488 
(7.19)*** 
0.453 
(7.21)*** 
0.440 
(5.18)*** 
UEFA03 0.140 
(1.30) 
0.215 
(2.80)*** 
0.134 
(2.23)** 
0.125 
(1.95)* 
0.042 
(0.58) 
UEFA04 0.184 
(1.26) 
0.270 
(3.07)*** 
0.302 
(5.08)*** 
0.191 
(2.34)** 
0.190 
(2.06)** 
Pseudo R2 0.42 0.40 0.37 0.37 0.38 
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Table 7: Footedness effects by position in European cross-section 
 
Position Two foot Left foot R2 
Defender 
 (1) 
 (2) 
 
0.304 (2.22)** 
0.134 (1.27) 
 
0.039 (0.45) 
0.059 (0.78) 
 
0.384 
0.562 
Midfield 
 (1) 
 (2) 
 
0.481 (4.87)*** 
0.214 (2.54)*** 
 
0.118 (1.38) 
0.187 (2.50)*** 
 
0.401 
0.597 
Forward 
 (1) 
 (2) 
 
0.400 (3.38)*** 
0.090 (0.92) 
 
0.230 (1.35) 
0.081 (0.58) 
 
0.365 
0.612 
Note: Model (1) specifications condition on demographics and ability to pay as per Table 4 
row 4. Model (2) specifications are as per Model (1) plus controls for performance as per 
Table 4 row 5. 
 
 
Table 8: Footedness effects for alternative model specifications with Bundesliga panel, 
N = 1321 
 
Specification Two foot Left foot R2 
Naïve 0.265 (2.59)*** 0.055 (0.55) 0.015 
Demographics 0.280 (3.08)*** -0.042 (0.49) 0.309 
Job 0.249 (2.73)*** -0.028 (0.34) 0.321 
Ability to pay 0.192 (2.28)** -0.026 (0.35) 0.385 
Performance 0.078 (1.37) 0.0000 (0.00) 0.611 
General* 0.131 (2.65)*** 0.009 (0.19) 0.664 
*Conditional on positive appearances last season, N = 978; club dummies included but 
jointly insignificant 
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Table 9: Quantile regression results for Bundesliga panel, N = 1325 
 
Variable 0.1 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.9 
Two foot 0.067 
(0.88) 
0.143 
(2.48)** 
0.128 
(2.72)*** 
0.111 
(2.15)** 
0.128 
(2.30)** 
Left foot 0.056 
(0.77) 
0.060 
(1.10) 
0.038 
(0.90) 
-0.014 
(0.30) 
-0.026 
(0.35) 
Age 0.432 
(4.11)*** 
0.429 
(5.06)*** 
0.323 
(4.75)*** 
0.212 
(3.80)*** 
0.215 
(2.64)*** 
Age2 -0.008 
(4.04)*** 
-0.008 
(4.85)*** 
-0.006 
(4.65)*** 
-0.004 
(3.74)*** 
-0.004 
(2.65)*** 
Midfield 0.079 
(1.31) 
0.077 
(1.45) 
0.048 
(1.27) 
0.036 
(0.78) 
0.039 
(0.67) 
Forward 0.133 
(1.78)* 
0.093 
(1.18) 
0.057 
(0.74) 
0.013 
(0.19) 
-0.003 
(0.04) 
Log 
attendance 
0.230 
(3.58)*** 
0.199 
(3.22)*** 
0.165 
(3.16)*** 
0.212 
(4.39)*** 
0.236 
(3.87)*** 
Appearances 0.036 
(9.74)*** 
0.029 
(9.61)*** 
0.017 
(7.07)*** 
0.016 
(8.00)*** 
0.009 
(3.80)*** 
Previous 
appearances 
0.001 
(1.67)* 
0.000 
(0.66) 
0.001 
(1.76)* 
0.000 
(0.12) 
0.001 
(1.50) 
Champion 0.230 
(3.35)*** 
0.235 
(3.61)*** 
0.144 
(2.52)** 
0.150 
(2.43)** 
0.085 
(1.28) 
UEFA 0.066 
(0.79) 
-0.012 
(0.17) 
0.060 
(0.98) 
0.010 
(0.17) 
-0.029 
(0.40) 
Goals per 
game 
0.423 
(1.50) 
0.643 
(2.02)** 
0.897 
(3.18)*** 
0.871 
(3.78)*** 
1.105 
(5.30)*** 
South 
American 
0.537 
(5.05)*** 
0.441 
(4.82)*** 
0.411 
(4.05)*** 
0.613 
(5.05)*** 
0.632 
(5.03)*** 
West 
European 
0.358 
(4.10)*** 
0.251 
(2.63)*** 
0.261 
(3.70)*** 
0.292 
(3.09)*** 
0.469 
(4.52)*** 
German 
international 
0.570 
(5.62)*** 
0.660 
(8.29)*** 
0.748 
(13.32)*** 
0.765 
(10.77)*** 
0.764 
(8.66)*** 
East 
European 
international 
0.390 
(3.50)*** 
0.420 
(4.53)*** 
0.503 
(5.37)*** 
0.579 
(6.48)*** 
0.615 
(3.46)*** 
South 
American 
international 
0.421 
(2.03)** 
0.563 
(4.44)*** 
0.511 
(4.44)*** 
0.280 
(2.00)** 
0.345 
(2.47)** 
West 
European 
international 
-0.006 
(0.05) 
0.167 
(1.28) 
0.283 
(2.58)*** 
0.292 
(2.30)** 
0.177 
(1.44) 
Pseudo R2 0.48 0.40 0.38 0.40 0.39 
Model also includes dummies for African, Asian and North American nationals (insignificant 
throughout with German national as base), other internationals (also insignificant with non-
international as base) and season dummies.  
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